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Comments
UMTA's Privatization Directive: Legal and Regulatory
Obstacles Barring Opportunities for the Private Sector
to Serve Transit Demand in Southwestern
Pennsylvania*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In October of 1984, the United States Department of Transportation Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) issued
a new policy' regarding private enterprise participation in the de* The

author would

like to acknowledge

the support of the Southwestern

Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (SPRPC). It should be noted, however, that
the contents of this report reflect the views of the author who is responsible for the facts
and the accuracy of the information presented herein. The contents do not necessarily
reflect the official views or policies of the SPRPC.
1. UMTA Notice of Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,310 (1984). This policy, entitled Private
Enterprise Participation in the Urban Mass Transportation Program became effective October 22, 1984 and provides in pertinent part:
I. Consultation with Private Providers in the Local Planning Process
A. Notifications. It is UMTA policy that local entities, as part of their transportation planning process, provide reasonable notice to private transportation providers
. . . regarding . . . opportunities for private transportation providers in order that
they may present their views concerning the development of local plans . . . . [Ilt is
also desirable to make known in advance the criteria which will be taken into account
in making public/private service decisions.
B. Early Consultation. It is UMTA policy that. . . private sector views and capabilities be assured by affording private providers an early opportunity to participate
in the development of projects that involve new or restructured mass transit services.

II. Consideration of Private Enterprise
A. Development of the Transportation Program. It is UMTA policy that private
providers be afforded an opportunity to participate in and have their views be considered in the development of the annual . . . element of the TIP [Transportation Improvement Program] before MPO
[Metropolitan Planning Organization]
endorsement.
B. Provision of Service by Private Operators Without Public Involvement. It is
UMTA policy that when new service needs are developed, or services are significantly
restructured, consideration should be given to whether private carriers could provide
such service in a manner which is consistent with local objectives and without public
subsidy. Moreover, existing transit services should be periodically reviewed to deter-
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velopment of plans and programs to be funded under the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended (UMT Act)2 . This
policy, which has become known as the "Privatization Directive,"
is an effort by the Reagan Administration to encourage a stronger
private sector role in addressing community transportation needs
and is an attempt by UMTA to satisfy a frequently voiced concern
of private transportation providers that "in spite of statutory requirements, public decision makers do not fully or fairly consider
the capacity of private enterprise to provide mass transportation
services."
The UMTA "Privatization Directive" attempts to breathe new
life into three provisions of the UMT Act. In general: section 8(e)
mine if they can be provided more efficiently by the private sector.
C. Opportunities for Private Carriers to Provide Assisted Services . . .

UMTA does not consider it acceptable for localities to foreclose opportunities for
private enterprise by simply pointing to local barriers to their involvement in federally assisted local transportation programs. In general, a simple reference . . . to public agency labor agreements or a local policy that calls for direct operation of all mass
transportation providers, would not satisfy the private enterprise requirements of the
act.
D. True Comparison of Costs. When comparing the service proposals made by public
and private entities . . . [s]ubsidies provided to public carriers, including operating
subsidies, capital grants and the use of public facilities should be reflected in the cost
comparisons.
Id. at 41,311-12.
2. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1601-1618
(1983).
3. 49 Fed. Reg. 41,310 (1984). This new UMTA policy statement articulates the
agency's view on how meaningful compliance with the private sector provisions of the UMT
Act can be accomplished. The notice points out that if private enterprise continues to be
unfairly excluded from the plans and programs funded under the UMT Act, it may be necessary for UMTA to introduce more direct federal measures for accomplishing its objectives.
Id. As one magazine has indicated: "Privatization simply means the contracting of all or
part of a public transit operation to the private sector, with the control of the operation (i.e.
setting fares, routes and schedules) remaining with the public transit authority." Contracting Cuts Costs, MERo Magazine, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 84.
4. 49 Fed. Reg. at 41,311. Section 3 of the UMT Act provides that:
[n]o financial assistance shall be provided . . . for the purpose . . . of acquiring any

interest in, or purchasing any . . . property of, a private mass transportation company

. . .

or for the purpose of providing

. . .

for the operation of mass transporta-

tion facilities or equipment in competition with, or supplementary to, the service provided by an existing mass transportation company, unless . . . the Secretary finds
that such program, to the maximum extent feasible, provides for the participation of
private mass transportation companies .

. ..

49 U.S.C. § 1602(e)(2) (footnotes omitted).
Section 8 of the UMT Act provides that "[t]he plans and programs required by this section shall encourage to the maximum extent feasible the participation of private enterprise."
49 U.S.C. § 1607(e).
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directs the recipients of UMTA funds to encourage the maximum
feasible participation of private enterprise; section 3(e) protects
private companies from unnecessary and unwarranted competition
with public mass transportation companies; and section 9(f)(2) sets
forth the manner for developing a program of projects to be
funded under the Act which clearly directs a participatory consultative process involving all interested parties and, in particular, private transportation carriers.'
Of particular interest to this comment is the language of the
"Privatization Directive" which states that "UMTA does not consider it acceptable for localities to foreclose opportunities for private enterprise by simply pointing to local barriers to their involvement in federally assisted local transportation programs."' In
general, this language is interpreted to mean that local legal, regulatory and labor contractual agreements should not bar public
transit operators from complying with the policy and the basic requirements of the relevant provisions of the UMT Act.
This comment will address the merits of the UMTA "Privatization Directive" by identifying the various legal and regulatory obstacles barring opportunities for the private sector to serve mass
transportation demands in the southwestern Pennsylvania region.'
By examining existing federal and state legislation which governs
private sector involvement in public transit operations, this comment will seek to identify the legal and regulatory impediments
which preclude increased opportunities for private enterprise and
determine what legislative reforms may be necessary for public
transit agencies to comply with UMTA's private sector participation policy.
Section 9 of the UMT Act provides that "[ejach recipient shall . . .develop a proposed
program of projects concerning activities to be funded in consultation with interested parties, including private transportation providers." 49 U.S.C. § 1607(f)(2). This new section 9
was added by Public Law 97-424. The former Section 9 was repealed by Public Law 95-599.
5.

49 Fed. Reg. at 41,311.

6.

49 Fed. Reg. at 41,312. See supra note 1.

7. The Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (SPRPC) which
was established in 1962 comprises the six counties of Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler,
Washington and Westmoreland. As southwestern Pennsylvania's designated Metropolitan
Planning Organization (MPO) and a recipient of federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration funds, the SPRPC is responsible for complying with the UMTA "privitization
directive" in the development of its transportation plans and programs.
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OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION

A.

Genesis of the Competitive Model

Ralph L. Stanley, Administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, points out that federal subsidies for mass
transit operating costs has declined from approximately $1.1 billion for fiscal year 1980 to $870 million in 1985.8 Because of this
decline, public transportation agencies are now faced with the
choice of curtailing services, increasing efficiency or turning to private operators.' Whatever the fate of federal assistance, however,
Wendell Cox, a consultant to the American Bus Association and
former member of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, believes that the financial crisis of public transit agencies
will continue because the crisis is "attributable to super-inflationary cost increases, not insufficient public revenues."10 Cox, who apparently reflects the sentiments of UMTA, cites rapidly increasing
driver wages and benefits, service level declines, fare level increases
and needed capital improvements as the motivating forces which
require public transit agencies to continually seek more public revenue. 1 But, "because public revenue sources rise at best with inflation, while transit cost rise above inflation Isitable public revenue
sources are not enough as long as costs are not stable."1 2
8. Tolchin, Private Concerns Gaining Foothold in Public Transit, N.Y. Times, Apr.
29, 1985, at 9, col. 1. See also CONG. BUDGET OFF., The Federal Budget for Public Works
Infrastructure,CBO Study, July, 1985, at 48 "The [Reagan] Administration has proposed
ending all federal operating assistance for transit in 1986, on the grounds that mass transit
operations are essentially of local rather than national interest, involving local decisions on
wages, fares, routes, and levels of service." Id.
9. Tolchin, supra note 8,at 1, col. 1. The "Privitization Directive," which took effect
in December of 1984, is expected to accelerate the shift to an increased use of private operators by public transportation agencies. "Supporters of such a shift contend that private operators can manage and operate transit lines with more efficiency and less expense, freed to
a degree from politics, bureaucracy and, in many cases, costly union contracts . . . .The
result, supporters say, is a decreased need for government subsidies." Id. at 1, col. 1 & at 9,
col. 1.
10. W. Cox, Transit Cost Control Through Competition, Presentation to the Annual
Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, in Washington (Jan. 14, 1985) [hereinafter

Transit Cost Control], reprinted in, AMERICAN Bus

ASSOCIATION, MASS TRANSIT PROGRAMS,

MARKETING OPPORTUNITIES IN PUBLIC TRANSIT. A WORKSHOP FOR PRIvATE Bus OPERATORS

Sept. 10, 1985, app. E. Cox points out that from 1976 to 1982, the nation's largest public bus
operators experienced unit cost increases 61 percent above the inflation rate. Cox is quick to
add, however, that although these cost increases have been attributed to rapidly increasing
driver wages and benefits, the record suggests that fare levels have increased, service levels
have declined and needed capital improvements have been delayed or canceled. Cox concludes that, "across the board, transit costs are out of control." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Cox contends that until public transit costs are controlled, services will continue to be curtailed, fare levels will continue to rise
and needed capital improvements will be ignored. The present system of government subsidy, which lacks an element of competitive
pressure, maintains Cox, is at the root of the problem."i Cox asserts that "the antidote to monopoly is competition" and that private service contracting is a particularly promising alternative to
spur competition and change present subsidy arrangements. 4 This
"Competitive Model," however, does not call for a wholesale attack
against the existing providers of transportation services,1 5 as was
the case when public operators almost completely displaced private
companies following World War 11.1" Under the "Competitive
Model," Cox advocates blending public and private roles by authorizing a policy body (public agency) to decide what services are
needed and then contracting the work to private companies in or17
der to meet transportation needs.
Despite the potential for increased efficiency and cost savings,
"many public agencies are aggressively fighting to keep their transportation monopoly."1 s Because public transit agencies are still re13. Id. With respect to this position, Cox wrote:
Transit service has historically been provided under monopoly mechanisms. This is
true under public ownership and operation, just as it was under private ownership
and operation. Monopolies tend to maximize revenues, and to impose products on
markets, with insufficient regard for the needs of the market. Certainly, this has been
characteristic of public transit.

Id.
14. Id. Cox sees private service contracting as a management tool which would allow
private providers to produce identical service for 35% to 70% less than the cost to public
operators. By introducing competition, public transit operators could obtain more cost-effective service, while retaining full policy control. Cox argues that since its conception in the
late 1970's as a strategy to control costs, this form of privitization has benefited both riders
and taxpayers virtually everywhere that it has been implemented. Id.
15. Tolchin, supra note 8, at 9, col. 1. According to recent policy discussions in Washington, government subsidies will still be necessary. However, as local public transit authorities become more efficient by contracting with private operators, the money collected from
passenger service will stretch further and thus require less: subsidy. Id.
16. In most American cities transit systems began as private enterprises. "But the
systems fell on hard times after World War II, as affluent city dwellers moved to the suburbs and relied on private automobiles and an expanding highway system." As a result,
most private transit systems were taken over by public agencies (local government) by the
late 1950's. Id. See George W. Hilton, Federal Transit Subsidies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974).
17. Conte, Resurgence of PrivateParticipationin Urban Mass Transit Stirs Debate,
Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1984, at 37, col. 6.
18. Id. at 40, col. 3. According to Cox, two basic arguments have been advanced by
public agencies against contracting with private operators:
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PHANTOM: The first category of arguments is directed
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sisting the participation of private enterprise, UMTA's "Privatization Directive" reemphasizes three provisions, sections 3(e)(2),
9(f)(2) and 8(e), of the UMT Act which require involvement of private operators in federally funded mass transportation programs."
These provisions are discussed in detail below.
An investigation into the federal laws governing mass transportation services reveals two federal acts that control a public transit
agency's ability to establish contractual agreements with private
transportation providers. Following is an overview of the pertinent
provisions of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as
amended, and the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982.20
1.

The UMT Act and the UMTA Policy

Section 3(e)(2) of the UMT Act provides protection to private
transit operators from competition from federally subsidized
transit programs.2 1 This provision of the Act suggests that UMTA
will provide no federal subsidy to any public transit operation
which will create a situation of unfair competition. A simple example best illustrates UMTA's concern. Suppose that an existing private operator is providing transit services in a given transportation
against the private monopolies which preceded the public take-over. . . . Private monopoly [however] is a phantom which has not been proposed for resurrection.
It is argued that private providers will select only the best routes, and that major
portions of the service area will be abandoned. It is further suggested that services
and fares will be uncoordinated and confusing to the public.
These arguments fail to recognize that. . . contracting, service and fare decisions are
made by the public transit agency, and not the private providers. The public agency,
not the private providers, decides which services should be contracted. The public
agency, not the private providers, establishes fares and schedules, the elements of
coordination.
ARGUMENTS BASED UPON INSTITUTIONAL TURF: The other category of arguments is rooted in the preservation and extension of the influence of the transit
agency . . . . Concerns are expressed that contracting for some services represents
abdication of the agency's public policy role or that the public agency may eventually
serve only the central city with direct services.
The public interest is served by higher service levels and lower fares. To the extent
that transit disregards alternatives to provide higher service levels and lower fares, it
runs afoul of the public interest. Urban areas are changing, mobility needs are changing and transit is changing. The purpose of transit is not to directly operate service, it
is to move people to the maximum extent possible with available resources.
Transit Cost Control, supra note 10, at app. E.
19. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1607. See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
20. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1601-1618
(1983); Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 1602(e)(2). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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corridor and that this private transit operator is functioning without any federal subsidy. Assume further that a public transit provider decides to expand its service area into the private carrier's
transportation corridor and then applies to UMTA for federal operating funds. Under section 3(e)(2) of the UMT Act this public
operator would not be eligible for federal subsidies because such
assistance would create a situation of unfair competition and undercut the private carrier's operation.
Section 9(f)(2) of the UMT Act requires public transit operators
(section 9 fund recipients) to fully involve private providers when
developing a proposed program of projects concerning activities to
be funded.2 2 Specifically, this section directs public transit operators to involve private carriers in projects to be funded under the
transit component of their Transportation Improvement Program
(TIP).2 3 The TIP planning process is the means by which the
states, the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), 24 and the
transit operators prioritize short and long range capital improvements. Competing projects are weighed against available funding
resources involving federal monies, to arrive at a locally agreed
upon spending plan.2 5 While the MPO is the focal point of the
transportation planning process, it is incumbent upon public
transit operators (recipients of UMTA section 9 funds) to ensure
consideration of the capabilities and views of private carriers in
their own internal planning process. 6
22. 49 U.S.C. § 1607(0(2). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
23. "'Transportation Improvement Program' means a staged multi-year program of
transportation improvements including an annual (or biennial) element." Urban Mass
Transportation Administration (UMTA)/Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Joint
Planning Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,339 (1983) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. §
450.104(b)(5)).
24. "Metropolitan planning organization" means that organization designated as being responsible, together with the state, for carrying out the provisions of 23 U.S.C. § 134, as
provided in 23 U.S.C. § 104(0(3), and capable of meeting the requirements of sections
3(e)(1), 5(1), 8(a) and (c) and 9(e)(3)(G) of the UMT Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 1602(e)(1), 1604(1),
1607(a) and (c) and 1607(e)(3)(G). The metropolitan planning organization is the forum for
cooperative transportation decision-making. Id. § 450.104(b)(3). See also infra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
25. Transit Cost Control, supra note 10, at app. F-2.
[LIong range transportation plans typically outline strategies and facilities for meeting future transportation demands generated by growth and the need to either replace or rehabilitate existing facilities. . . . Short range plans will typically focus on
transportation system and facility management to make most effective use of existing
plant and equipment and near term capital improvements.
Id.
26. Letter from Peter N. Stowell to Region III Grantees and MPOs (Jan. 22, 1985)
(notes on the UMTA Policy Statement based on the provision of section 8, 3(e) and 9(f) of
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Section 8(e) of the UMT Act requires that "[t]he plans and programs . . . encourage to the maximum extent feasible the participation of private enterprise.""7 This charge is incorporated in the8
mandates of the UMTA/FHWA Joint Planning Regulations
which first requires the urban transportation planning process to
include the development of: "a transportation plan which describes
policies, strategies and facilities or changes in facilities proposed"
as well as "a staged multiyear program [TIP] of transportation improvement projects consistent with the Transportation Plan."2 9
Secondly, these joint planning regulations assign the MPO with
the responsibility of endorsing the Transportation Plan and the
TIP since "[t]hese endorsements are prerequisites for the approval
of programs and projects in urbanized areas . . . ."30 Finally, the
UMTA/FHWA Joint Planning Regulations declare that the urban
transportation "planning process shall be consistent with section
8(e) . . . of the UMT Act concerning involvement31of the appropriate public and private transportation providers.
Section 8(e) of the UMT Act requires the MPO, as the focus of
the transportation planning process, to assume primary responsibility for ensuring that the transportation plans and the TIP include private sector participation before it provides the final stamp
of local approval.32 In addition, the UMTA/FHWA Joint Planning
Regulations provide that the state and the MPO must certify to
UMTA that the planning process conforms with this section 8(e)
requirement. According to the National Association of Regional
Councils Federal Liaison, "UMTA will monitor the compliance
with private enterprise provisions of the [UMT] ACT as part of
the annual audits and triennial reviews required under Section 9
"33

The UMTA "Privatization Directive" was essentially intended to
enforce sections 3(e), 8(e) and 9(f) of the UMT Act by outlining
the guidelines to be considered by public transit agencies in order
the UMT Act).
27. 49 U.S.C. § 1607(e). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
28. Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA)/Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Joint Planning Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,340 (1983) (to be codified at 23
C.F.R. § 450.110).
29. Id. § 450.110(a)and (b).
30. Id. § 450.112(b).
31. Id. § 450.114(b)(1).
32. Letter from Peter N. Stowell to Region III Grantees and MPOs (Jan. 22, 1985).
33. Letter from Christina K. Steinman to MPO Executive Directors (Oct. 26, 1984)
(UMTA policy directive on private sector participation in the planning process).
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to comply with the legislative intent of involving private carriers in
public transit operations.3 4 These guidelines are considered the
general ground rules to ensure that public and private transit operators compete fairly in their efforts to provide transit services. The
UMTA policy basically requires: early involvement of private operators in the planning of services; evaluation of the private operator's ability to meet service needs in the market place without subsidy; opportunities for the private sector to present service
proposals for new or restructured services developed by the public;
and fair comparison of costs.3 5 Although "UMTA does not intend
to dictate specific ways of addressing the factors to be considered
in judging compliance with this policy,"3 UMTA has made it clear
that it
is dead serious about this issue. It will not allow MPOs to "get off the hook"
by pointing to local obstacles which bar the involvement of private operators in UMTA assisted programs. . . [nor will it] hesitate suspending planning funds to any MPO that is not establishing procedures to involve private transportation operators. 7

2.

The BRRA of 1982 and the ICC

The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 (BRRA) was a comprehensive package of revisions designed to significantly ease entry
and exit requirements for regular-route intercity operations, create
a process for preemption of burdensome state regulations, and remove "closed-door" restrictions that barred service to intermediate
points on existing intercity routes.38
The language of the Congressional Findings section of the
34.

Id.

35. Letter from Ralph L. Stanley to Metropolitan Planning Organizations (February
22, 1985) (officially transmitting the UMTA Policy Statement on Private Enterprise Participation in Urban Mass Transportation Program). See also supra note 1.
36. Letter from Peter N. Stowell to Region III Grantees and MPOs (Jan. 22, 1985)
(notes on the UMTA Policy Statement based on the provision of Section 8, 3(e) and 9(f) of
the UMT Act).
37. Letter from Christina K. Steinman to MPO Executive Directors (Oct. 26, 1984)
(UMTA policy directive on private sector participation in the planning process).
38. Fravel, Intercity Bus Service Changes Following the Bus Regulatory Reform Act
of 1982, Transp. Research Rec. 1012, 1985, at 38, 39. "Regular-route service is scheduled
operations over fixed routes and between fixed termini according to a predetermined plan,
often serving intermediate points. A regular-route authorization includes authority to perform special and charter operations over the subject route." Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56),
Applications For Operating Authority-Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62, at 73
(1982).
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BRRA39 is clearly consistent with the UMTA policy statement and
the related provisions of the UMT Act. The national transportation policy objectives of the BRRA "encourages the establishment
and maintenance of reasonable rates . . . without . . . unfair or
destructive competitive practices. ' 40 Other sections of the Act en-

courage competitive transportation services in order to improve
and maintain a sound private motor carrier system," ensure that
federal reform initiatives enacted by the BRRA do not nullify state
regulatory actions,42 and reflect key factors identified in UMTA's
"Privatization Directive."4 The directive's cautionary note also encourages that local obstacles not bar opportunities for private enin federally assisted local transportation
terprise participation
4
programs. "
With regard to new entry into the bus industry, the BRRA has
substantially changed the policies and procedures of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC): it is now presumed that increased
competition will benefit the public; and, carriers may now apply to
the ICC for both interstate and intrastate authority, or for intrastate authority only.' 5 Such changes to the entry provisions have

significantly stimulated the involvement of those carriers interested in providing new regular-route services. 46 The entry policy of
39. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 3, 96 Stat. 1102, 1102
(1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982)). The Congressional Findings section of the
BRRA states in pertinent part:
[A] competitive . . . motor bus system contributes to the maintenance of a strong
national economy . . .; that historically the existing Federal and State regulatory
structure has tended. . . to inhibit market entry, carrier growth, maximum utilization of equipment and energy resources, and opportunities for minorities and others
to enter the motor buys industry; . . . that overly protective regulation has resulted
in operating inefficiencies and diminished price and service competition. . .; that the
objectives contained in the national transportation policy can best be achieved
through greater competition and reduced regulation ;. . . [and that] the Interstate
Commerce Commission should be given explicit direction for reduced regulation of
the motor bus industry and should do everything within its power to promote competition in the . . . industry ....
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 5(a)(1)(D), 96 Stat. 1102, 1103 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)
(1982)).
41. Id. § 5(a)(2)(G).
42. Id. § 5 (a)(3)(C).
43. Id. §§ 5(a)(1)(D) and (5)(2)(G). See also letter from Ralph L. Stanley to MPOs
(Feb. 22, 1985) (officially transmitting the UMT Policy Statement). See supra notes 1 & 35
and accompanying text.
44. Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 5(a)(3)(C), 96 Stat. 1102, 1103 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. I 101]01(a)(1982)). See supra notes 6 & 37 and accompanying text.
45. Fravel, supra note 38, at 43.
46. Id. Between the enactment of the BRRA in October of 1982 and October 10,
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the BRRA contains two new entry provisions, sections 6(c)(2)(A)
and (B), which are applicable to motor carriers seeking certification from the ICC to provide regular-route transit services entirely
47
in one state.
Section 6(c)(2)(A) of the BRRA is used only by applicants seeking a regular-route certificate entirely in one state, but already authorized by the ICC to provide interstate transportation of passengers for that route over which the intrastate transportation is
proposed. 8 The ICC will issue a certificate to applicants that are
"fit, willing, and able"' 9 to provide service unless a protestant can
1983, the number of applications for new operating authority has increased greatly. Regularroute applications alone, during this one year period, totaled 225, an increase of 275% over
the average of the five previous years. Although the 225 figure includes new interstate as
well as intrastate applications, not all of the 225 applications have been granted nor have all
those granted been implemented. Nevertheless, the interest of the carriers in providing new
services is apparent. Id. at 43-44.
47. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(2)(A) & (B), 96
Stat. 1102, 1104 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (c)(2)(A) & (B)(1982)). Section 6
(c)(2)(A) of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 provides in pertinent part:
(2)(A) The Commission [ICCI shall issue a certificate . . .authorizing . . . regularroute transportationentirely in one State as a motor common carrier of passengers
if such intrastate transportation is to be provided on a route over which the carrier
has authority on the effective date of this subsection to provide interstate transportation of passengers if the Commission finds that the person [applicant] is fit, willing,
and able to provide the intrastate transportation ...,unless the Commission finds,
on the basis of evidence presented by any person objecting to the issuance of the
certificate, that the transportation to be authorized would directly compete with a
commuter bus operation and it would have a significant adverse effect on commuter
bus service in the area in which the competing service will be performed.
Id. § 6(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Section 6(c)(2)(B) of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 provides in pertinent part:
(B) The Commission shall issue a certificate . .. authorizing . . . regular-route
transportationentirely in one State as a motor common carrier of passengers if such
intrastate transportation is to be provided on a route over which the carrierhas been
granted authority, or will be granted authority,after the effective date of this section to provide interstate transportationof passengers if the Commission finds that
the person [applicant] is fit, willing, and able to provide the intrastate transportation
...,unless the Commission finds, on the basis of evidence presented by any person
objecting to the issuance of the certificate, that the transportationto be authorized
is not consistent with the public interest.
Id. § 6(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
48. Id. § 6(c)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 1102, 1104 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (c)(2)(A)
(1982)). See supra note 47.
49. 47 Fed. Reg. 42,935 (1982) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 1045B, 1046, 1100, and
1130a) (proposed Sept. 29, 1982).
Every applicant for motor common. .
authority has the burden of demonstrating
only that it is fit, willing and able to provide the transportation to be authorized by
the certificate .....
"Fit, willing, and able" is specifically defined in sections
10922(c)(6) and 10923(b)(2) as safety fitness and proof of insurance pursuant to the
minimum financial responsibility requirements of section 18 of the Act.
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show that the issuance of the certificate "would directly compete
with commuter bus operations and it would have a significant adverse effect on commuter bus service"0 in the area in which the
competing service will be performed."8 1 According to an ICC representative however, there have been very few applications for new
entry services under this provision since the enactment of the
BRRA because the only applicants eligible under section 6(c)(2)(A)
are "old certificate" holders who already have intrastate
authority. 52
Section 6(c)(2)(B) of the BRRA has invited most of the new entry applications since the Act's enactment in 1982." This provision
issues an intrastate, regular-route certificate to carriers seeking authorization to operate on a route over which the carrier had or will
be granted authority to provide interstate transportation after the
enactment of the BRRA in 1982, if the ICC finds the applicant is
"fit, willing, and able" and a protestant is unable to show issuance
is "not consistent with the public interest. 5' 4 The primary change
with regard to this provision was the enactment of a public interest
standard which has effectively shifted the burden of proof (in an
application for a new authority) from the carrier requesting the
new authority to the party protesting the application.55 The public
interest standard establishes a presumption that increased competition will benefit the public, thus, protestants must bear the burden of providing sufficient evidence to negate this presumption.5
Section 6(c)(3) of the BRRA directs the ICC to consider four facId.
50. "Commuter bus operations" means short-haul regularly scheduled passenger service provided by motor vehicle in metropolitan and suburban areas utilized primarily by
passengers using reduced-fare, multiple-ride, or commutation tickets during peak period(s].
Id. § 6(d)(1), 96 Stat. 1102, 1107 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 10102 (1982)).
The ICC has solicited comments on how to determine a "significant adverse effect." Currently, it is not clear whether an applicant must show an adverse effect to only the route
proposed in the application, or an adverse effect to the entire area in which the competing
service will be performed. The ICC has not ruled on this distinction and plans to develop
these concepts on a case-by-case basis. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications For Operating Authority-Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62, 71 (1982).
51. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(2)(A), 96 Stat.
1102, 1104, 1982 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (c)(2)(A) (1982)). See supra note 47.
52. Telephone interview with Barbara Reideler, Interstate Commence Commission
(Oct. 8, 1985) (Intrastate Entry).
53.

Id.

54. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(2)(B), 96 Stat.
1102, 1104 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(2)(B) (1982)). See supra note 47.
55. Fravel, supra note 38, at 38, 43.
56.

Id.
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tors when determining if the issuance of an application is consistent with the "public interest. 5 7 Although these public interest
factors devote particular attention to the effect of an application
upon service to small communities and upon commuter bus operations, protestants (usually small carriers) have urged the ICC to
accord significant weight to the impairment factor of the public
interest test. s5 The ICC has responded however, that Congress has
placed paramount consideration on the benefits to be derived by
the public and not the protection of carriers, that the impairment
prong of the test is only one of four factors to be considered by the
ICC, and, that these factors are to be given equal weight. Therefore, these factors are balanced against each other when making
the public interest determination. 9
The foregoing paragraphs emphasize Congress' intent to make
entry into the bus system easier under the BRRA of 1982 than it
had been for motor carriers under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.60
Section 6(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2)(B) of the BRRA, which allows carriers to obtain interstate as well as intrastate regular-route certificates, appears to satisfy Congressional objectives since it has literally opened the doors to the entry of new operators into the bus
industry."1 Although the new entry provisions have permitted more
private carriers to become involved in the bus industry, those car57. These four factors are:
(A) the transportation policy of section 10101(a) of this title [see supra note 40 and
accompanying text];
(B) the value of competition to the traveling and shipping public;
(C) the effect of issuance of the certificate on motor carrier of passenger service to
small communities; and
(D) whether issuance of the certificate would impair the ability of any other motor
common carrier of passengers to provide a substantial portion of the regular-route
passenger service which such carrier provides over its entire regular-route system
Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(3), 96 Stat. 1102, 1105-06
(1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(3) (1982)). Regarding the fourth factor, a protestant
relying on this criterion is required to establish that granting the application would jeopardize its ability to continue operating over a substantial portion of its "entire regular-route
system" (defined to include the routes of the company's subsidiaries and affiliates). Ex Parte
No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications for Operating Authority-Motor Passenger Carriers, 133
M.C.C. 62, at 68 (1982).
58. 133 M.C.C. at 68-69.
59. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(3), 96 Stat. 1102,
1105-06 (1982). See supra note 57.
60. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications for Operating Authority-Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. at 68-69
61. Id. at 68. See Report of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, H.R. 334, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 29 (1982).
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riers who were operating before the BRRA was enacted in 1982
(existing operators) have not welcomed the resulting increase in
competition. This observation is documented by the fact that small
carriers have protested the system-wide approach to the impairment test and have made efforts to persuade the ICC to accord
more weight to the impairment prong of the four part public interest test.2
The exit process has also been changed under the BRRA. Section 16 has increased flexibility with regard to that process by preempting state regulatory authority, which the ICC considered to be
a burden on interstate commerce.6 3 This new exit provision permits carriers to apply to the ICC for a discontinuance of intrastate
services over interstate routes when carriers have been denied such
permission by the state regulatory authority or when the state authority has failed to act on such petition within 120 days of the
carrier's initial complete filing with the state authority." Section
16(e)(1)(A) requires the ICC to grant the carrier's petition to discontinue service unless it finds, on the evidence of a protestant,
that the discontinuance is not consistent with the public interest
or that continuing the transportation without the proposed discontinuance will not constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.6 5 In making its finding the ICC is directed to place
great weight on the extent to which intrastate and interstate revenues from the services to be discontinued are less than the variable
costs including depreciation for revenue equipment.6 6
By the end of November 1983, about one year after the enactment of the BRRA, eighteen cases had been decided by the ICC, in
fifteen of which the ICC had granted the carrier's petition to discontinue service.67 In the first case to reach the Commission the
variable costs of providing the service exceeded the revenues, and
the ICC, following the "great weight" directive of section 16(g)(1),
62. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
63. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications for Operating Authority-Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. at 68-69. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
64. Fravel, supra note 38, at 38.
65. Bus Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 16(e)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 1102,
1115 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(e)(1)(A) (1982)).
66. Id. § 16(g)(1), 96 Stat. 1102, 1117 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(g)(1)
(1982)). Three other considerations are: the National Transportation Policy enunciated in
49 U.S.C. 10101; whether the carrier has been offered a subsidy to continue the service; and,
whether it is the last service available to the communities on the affected routes and what
alternative may be available. Id. § 16 (g)(1)(A)(B)(C), 96 Stat. 1102, 1117 (1982). (Codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(g)(1)(A)(B)(C) (1982)).
67. Fravel, supra note 38, at 40.
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decided to permit the abandonment and preempt a denial by the
West Virginia Public Service Commission.68 In other cases in
which the ICC denied the carrier's petition to abandon, the carrier
had either failed to provide the mandated support data documenting the fact that variable costs exceeded the revenues produced, or had its petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
the carrier had not followed the established state procedures prior
to its appeal to the ICC. 9
Thus, case law during the year following the enactment of the
BRRA indicates that the ICC will grant a petition to abandon intrastate service over interstate routes if the carrier demonstrates
that its variable costs exceed the revenues produced by that service.70 However, the carrier seeking discontinuance of intrastate
services still has the responsibility of making initial application for
abandonment to the appropriate state regulatory authority and
must follow the correct state procedures." It is important to note
that although the states have retained their authority to review
and decide service discontinuance cases, as a result of section 16 of
the BRRA, "the ICC has become the final authority through the
creation of an appeals process, with definite standards for the ICC
' 72
to follow in permitting abandonments denied by the state.
B.

State Legislation

An investigation into the state laws governing mass transportation services in southwestern Pennsylvania reveals three pieces of
legislation which influence a public transit agency's ability to establish contractual agreements with private transportation providers: the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code (PUC); the Municipality
Authorities Act of 1945; and the Second Class County Port Authority Act. 73 Generally, the PUC exercises jurisdiction over the
68. Petition of Greyhound Lines for Review of a Decision of the West Virginia Public
Service Commission, Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10935, before the ICC, Dckt. No. MC-1515 (Sub332), decided Aug. 23, 1983. See Fravel, supra note 38, at 40.
69. Fravel, supra note 38, at 40. See e.g., Petition of Virginia State Lines for Review
of a Decision of the West Virginia Public Service Commission, Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10935,
Dckt. No. MC-59238 (Sub-74), decided Sept. 9, 1983, Petition of Greyhound Lines for Review of a Decision of the Georgia Public Service Commission, Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10935,
Dckt. No. MC-1515 (Sub-331), decided July 22, 1983.
70. Fravel, supra note 38, at 40. "It seems unlikely then that carriers will bring such
petitions [to the ICCI in the future unless they have developed such evidence." Id.
71. Id. at 39.
72. Id. at 38.
73. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon 1978 & Supp. 1984);
Second Class County Port Authority Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 1414, as amended, 55 PA.
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transportation of persons between points in Pennsylvania." The
Municipality Authorities Act of 1945 and the Second Class County
Port Authority Act, however, provide exceptions to the PUC's
jurisdiction.
Under the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, multiple municipalities and entire counties are permitted to form a transit authority to provide mass transit services." Moreover, these "municipal
corporations" are expressly excluded from PUC jurisdiction. 7' As a
result, several transit authorities have been formed in southwestern Pennsylvania pursuant to this Act. 77 While they are limited in
scope they are allowed, among other things, to own or lease as either lessor or lessee, municipal transportation projects. 7 Further,
it is unclear whether the statute confines the operations of a municipal transit authority to the geographical limitations of those
municipalities which make up the authority. According to Commonwealth v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority,7 9 the courts
have "consistently held that municipal authorities are not creatures, agents or representatives of the municipalities which organize them, but rather are 'independent agencies of the Commonwealth.' ,s Thus, if an authority is an independent agent of the
Commonwealth, 8 it would seem that the operations of the authority are not specifically confined to the geographical boundaries of
the municipalities which constitute the authority. Moreover,
if the municipalities set up a transit authority to operate mass transit ser-

CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 551 (Purdon Supp. 1986); Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No.
382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
74. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301-2305 (Purdon 1978 & Supp.
1984).
75. The term "municipality" is defined to mean any county, city, town, borough,
township or school district of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Municipalities Authorities Act of 1945, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(f) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
76. The term "corporation" includes "all bodies corporate ... but shall not include
municipal corporations." Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1978).
77. Within the six-county southwestern Pennsylvania region (Allegheny, Armstrong,
Beaver, Butler, Washington and Westmoreland counties) there are five transit authorities
which were created under the Municipality Authorities Act enabling legislation. They include: the Beaver County Transit Authority (BCTA); Greater Aliquippa Transit Authority
(GATA); Mid County Transit Authority (MCTA); Mid Mon Valley Transit Authority
(MMVTA); and the Westmoreland County Transit Authority (WCTA).
78. Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A)(a)(3) (Purdon 1978).
79. 444 Pa. 345, 281 A.2d 882 (1971).
80. Id. at 348, 281 A.2d at 884, quoting, Whitemarsh Twp. Auth. v. Elwert, 413 Pa.
329, 332, 196 A.2d 843, 845 (1964).
81. There are no cases specifically addressing this issue.
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vices for the benefit of the public living within the general area, it would
seem logical that the buses could operate within the scope of the territory
which the authority was designed to encompass. This would include the
forming municipalities and areas reasonably adjacent thereto. A logical interpretation of the motor bus provision . . . would confine the rendition of
service to movements between points within the underlying municipalities
and from points in those municiaplities to other points within the general
area encompassed by the municipal authority. ... 2

Therefore, an argument can be made that the municipal transit
authority can extend its operations to areas reasonably adjacent to
the municipality. The problem with such an extension is that the
PUC has jurisdiction over areas outside the municipality's corporate limits. Section 1102 of the Public Utility Code, which enumerates acts requiring PUC certification, states that a municipal corporation providing a public utility service beyond its corporate
limits must acquire a PUC certificate of operation."5 The exception
from PUC jurisdiction therefore, is limited. Indeed, "[p]ublic
transit operations actually conducted by a municipal transit authority properly created under the Municipality Authorities Act
are exempt from Public Utility Commission . . . rules and regulations. . so long as service is not rendered beyond the authority's
corporate boundary.""
Another exception to the PUC's jurisdiction over the transportation of persons between points in Pennsylvania can be found with
regard to transportation services rendered by the Port Authority of
Allegheny County (Port Authority). 6 In order to provide a unified
transportation system for Allegheny County, the Pennsylvania
Legislature created the Port Authority and defined its rights, powers and purposes in section 3 of the Port Authority Act which
states in pertinent part that "[e]ach authority shall be for the purpose of. . . operating . . . a transportation system in the county
82. Letter from S. Berne Smith to Aldo Nones (Jan. 14, 1985) (emphasis added) (discussing possible schedule route options in the Monongahela valley).
83. 66 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 102(a)(5) (Purdon 1978). Section 102(a)(5) provides in
part:
(a) General rule.-Upon the application... and the approval of such application by
the Commission, evidenced by its certificate of public convenience ... , it shall be
lawful: (5) For any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate
...for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service beyond
its corporate limits.
Id. (emphasis added).

84. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 5) (discussing
issues raised by the Beaver County Transit Authority).
85. Second Class County Port Authority Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 1414, as amended,
55 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 551-563.5 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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by which it is incorporated and outside of the county to the extent
necessary (i) for the establishment of an integrated system
... ,"S In vesting the Port Authority with exclusive jurisdiction
over the transportation system within Allegheny County, the legislature explicitly divested the PUC of jurisdiction over that transportation system: "[tihe Public Utility Commission shall have no
authority to grant certificates of public convenience for a transportation system within the service area of the authority or for the
establishment of group and party rights to operate wholly within
' a7
such service area.
As the above discussion illustrates, private operators attempting
to offer services on behalf of, or in conjunction with, a public
transit authority are increasingly encountering problems under the
federal and state regulations. The issues surrounding these
problems will be presented in various scenarios involving both private and public parties.
1. Contracts Between an Operating Municipal Transit Authoritya and a Non-PUC Certified Carrier
A common scenario is this: a private operator, P, who possess no
PUC certificates of operation covering routes within the service
area of the operating municipal transit authority X, approaches X
for the purpose of entering into a contract under which P would
provide certain services on behalf of X within X's legal service
area.
As a "municipal corporation," a municipal transit authority is
exempt from PUC regulation over transportation services provided
within its legal service area.8 9 In addition, it has been established
that the PUC has no power over the agents of an authority when
the authority exercises pervasive control over these agents.9 0 In
86. Id. § 553(a).
87. Id. § 563.1.
88. An operating municipal transit authority has been defined as one which "operates
its own facilities [in the case of a transit authority it operates its own buses]. It is responsible for the sale of the service, [the establishment of service levels and routing] . . .and...
financing the project [the setting of transit fares]." Dennis, Municipal Authorities in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Dep't of Community Affairs (3d ed. Apr. 1985). Edition, Harrisburg,
April 1982 at 15.
89. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1978). See supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
90. Brocal Corp. v. Wheels, Pa. P.U.C., Dckt. No. C-812799 at 4 (order entered June
16, 1983).
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Breston v. City of Bradford,9" the PUC disclaimed regulatory control over utility facilities owned and operated by the authority itself or operated by an agent or lessee within the authority's lawful
service area.92 Also, according to an opinion of the chief counsel of
the PUC, if an authority exercises pervasive control, through contract, over a carrier, that carrier need not hold a PUC certificate,
since the carrier is operating under the aegis of the authority, not
of the PUC. 3 The PUC's chief counsel notes, however, that the
authority's exercise of pervasive control over the carrier's rates,
routes and service characteristics can only be determined by the
PUC on a case-by-case basis after an examination of the facts on
record."'
With regard to the aforementioned scenario, there is an issue as
to whether a contracted operation, between a municipal authority
and a non-PUC certified carrier, would unfairly compete with existing services provided by a PUC certified carrier. Such unfair
competition would result in a violation of the Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act and the Eminent Domain Code, and would
require the Authority to compensate the certified carrier.
A transit authority formed under the Municipality Authorities
Act must operate in accordance with and carry out the purposes of
that Act. Section 306(A) states, in pertinent part:
[t]he purpose and intent of this act being to benefit the people of the Commonwealth. . ., and not to unnecessarily burden or interfere with existing
business by the establishment of competitive enterprises, none of the powers granted by this act shall be exercised in the construction, improvement,
maintenance, extension or operation of any project or projects which in
whole or part shall duplicate or compete with existing enterprises serving
substantially the same purposes. 5

With regard to active existing carriers, an important case decided
by the commonwealth court focused on whether new services provided by an authority competed with or duplicated the service of
91. 41 Pa. P.U.C. 349 (1964).
92. Id. at 354.
93. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, to Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (Jan. 18, 1985
at 1-2) (discussing SPRPC's requested clarification of four specific issues regarding transportation services).
94. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, to Drew DeCandis, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (July 19, 1983 at
2) (discussing PUC Regulatory Authority over Medical Transportation Services). See Brocal, Pa. P.U.C. Dckt. No. C-812799 at 4 (order entered June 16, 1983).
95. Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A)(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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6
an existing carrier. In Para Transit Corp. v. County of Monroe,"
petitioner alleged that as a consequence of the creation of a scheduled route service, by a transit authority established under the
auspices of the Municipality Authorities Act, his call or demand
taxicab service and a paratransit service were destroyed.9 7 Petitioner also alleged violation of the Eminent Domain Code,9 s arguing that the scheduled route service of the transit authority directly competed with his enterprise and, "in effect, took his
business profits without any compensation." 9
The issue presented in Para Transit, therefore, was whether the
new services provided by the public transit authority duplicated or
competed with an existing enterprise serving substantially the
same purpose.10 0 The commonwealth court stated that "[i]f the
services provided by the County's new scheduled route service are
distinct, there is no violation of the Municipal Authorities Act and
no de facto taking of. . .property."101 The commonwealth court
found that the new services were different and satisfied a different
community need and as such did not serve substantially the same
purpose nor constitute a de facto taking of business profit.1 02 Because the court found that the services were not competitive or
duplicative, it did not address the issue of compensation due an
existing carrier. The following language of the court in Para
Transit, however, suggests that if the specific facts of a case indicate that new services duplicate or compete with existing enterprises serving substantially the same purposes, it could be found
that some compensation would be due existing carriers. "Because
we have concluded that there has been no taking, it is not necessary for our purposes to decide whether the property discussed

96. 79 Pa. Commw. 104, 468 A.2d 548 (1983).
97. Id. at 105, 468 A.2d at 549.
98. Eminent Domain Code of 1964, Pub. L. -No. 84, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-101
(Purdon 1966).
99. 79 Pa. Commw. at 105, 468 A.2d at 549 (1983).
100. Id. at 106, 468 A.2d at 550.
101. Id. (emphasis added). See also Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp.-Auth.
(SEPTA) v. Yellow Limousine Serv., Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. 572, 312 A.2d 79 (1973). In the
SEPTA case, an authority formed pursuant to the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 984, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2001, a limousine and call or demand service company protested the extension of SEPTA's scheduled route service into the
area where the cab and limousine service was operating. The commonwealth court held that
such services were distinguishable and did not constitute unfair competition, reasoning that
the existing service did not serve substantially the same purpose as the new mass transit
system operating on scheduled routes. 10 Pa. Commw. at 579, 312 A.2d at 82.
102. 79 Pa. Commw. at 107, 468 A.2d at 550.
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herein could constitute the type of property interest compensable
under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code."'' 3
Thus, an authority has no obligation to compensate a certified
PUC carrier for business loss merely because the authority contracted with a non-certified carrier. If, however, the new services of
an authority duplicate or compete with an existing service for substantially the same purpose, the Eminent Domain Code may require the authority to compensate the existing carrier for business
losses. As a practical matter, however, new services of an authority
which serve substantially the same purposes as an existing carrier
may occur simultaneously for an interim period of time. Viewing
the facts of Para Transit as an example, the municipal transit authority was established on October 5, 1979 to operate the scheduled route service system that was the subject of the controversy. 10 4 It was not until December 15, 1983 that the
commonwealth court of Pennsylvania rendered a decision. 0 5 Assuming that services in such a time frame would have served substantially the same purpose and that an injunction would not have
been granted by the court of common pleas, it is conceivable that
duplicative and competitive services could have continued simultaneously for over four years.
Another question raised can be stated as follows: presuming the
new service is found to be substantially for the same purpose and
compensation is due the existing enterprise, must the authority
cease its competing and duplicative service after compensation has
been paid? Although Para Transit does not answer this question
either, the following language of section 306(A) suggests that the
new service of the Authority may not be provided; "none of the
powers granted by this act shall be exercised in the . . . extension
or operation of any project. . . which. . . shall duplicate . . . existing enterprises . .1.0.
Another issue that arises under the facts of the first scenario, is
whether an authority can contract with a non-certificated carrier to
provide service in an area where the PUC has certified a carrier,
but where the carrier's rights were dormant at the time the authority initiated a contract with the non-certified carrier? In a legal
opinion prepared for the Beaver County Transit Authority, counsel
103. Id. at 107-08, 468 A.2d at 550.
104. Id. at 105, 468 A.2d at 549.
105. Id. at 104, 468 A.2d. at 548.
106. Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A)(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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asserted that in a situation where a PUC certificate holder has not
exercised its rights, a municipal transit authority could effectively
argue that the holder's ownership of the dormant rights would not
amount to a competing transit service. Therefore, the authority
would not violate the anti-competitive provision of section 306(A)
of the Municipality Authorities Act.1"7 Counsel pointed out, however, that a certificate holder would still be able to file suit against
the municipal authority seeking an injunction for instituting a duplicating or competing service as prohibited by the Municipality
Authorities Act.108 In addition, the certified carrier could also file
suit seeking an injunction which could prevent UMTA from
awarding the public transit authority federal funding.109
An interesting case which refutes the argument that a holder's
ownership of dormant rights could not constitute a competitive or
duplicative enterprise is Warminster Township Municipal Authority v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.110 In Warminster, an authority was established under the Municipality Authorities Act "as the sole and exclusive instrumentality for constructing
'1
and operating a public sewerage system within the township."
Subsequently, the PUC granted certificates of public convenience
to a private sewerage company to provide service to the public in a
designated portion of Warminster Township.1 1 2 In the appeal by
the authority over the issuance of the certificates, the superior
court, relying on section 306(A) of the Municipality Authorities
Act, made the following observation on the effect the certification
would have on the authority: "[alithough the Authority is not subject to the general regulatory jurisdiction of the commission . ..
the effect of the grant of certificates of public convenience to
Hartsville [the private company] is to preclude the Authority from
subsequently rendering competitive sewerage service to the same
13
area."9
The implication of this observation is that the bare certificate
alone is sufficient to preclude an authority from rendering services
which are substantially similar to those in existence and that the
107. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 3-4) (discussing
issues raised by Beaver County Transit Authority).
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. 185 Pa. Super. 431, 138 A.2d 240 (1958).
111. Id. at 435, 138 A.2d at 242.
112. Id. at 433, 138 A.2d at 241.
113. Id. at 442, 138 A.2d at 245.
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argument with regard to dormant rights is meritless.
In the alternative, Thompson Appeal," 4 appears to suggest that
a municipal authority may condemn existing rights if there is substantial evidence to justify a taking for the benefit of the public.
According to Thompson Appeal, a municipal authority has the
power to acquire, in an eminent domain proceeding, the rights of a
certified holder where the new services offered the public are not
substantially similar to those existing, whether or not at the the
time of the condemnation the rights were being exercised by a
PUC holder. 1 15 Section 306(A) of the Municipality Authorities Act
provides that municipal authorities created under this Act "shall
be for the purpose of acquiring,holding, constructing,. . . projects
of the following character [including transportation].""' 6 In reference to the anti-competitive proviso which also appears in section
306(A), the court in Thompson Appeal noted that the omission of
the power to acquire and hold property was a deliberate attempt
by the legislature to show that the proviso was not designed to be a
restriction upon the authority's right to condemn.1 7 The court
pointed out that the primary purpose of the proviso is to protect
businesses which would be competing with the condemnor's (authority's) operation, "because any loss of business resulting from
such competition is not compensable under the Eminent Domain
Code.""' 8 Thus, where the condemnee (an existing operation) is
found not to be in competition with the municipal services proposed and the condemnee will receive full compensation for the
taking, the justification for the anti-competitive proviso
disappears. 1 9
Finally, it should be noted that, although it appears that a municipal authority has the power under the Eminent Domain Code
and Municipality Authorities Act to acquire the rights of an existing PUC certificate holder, such an approach carries with it the
expense of litigation and the publicity involved in a lawsuit. 20 For
these reasons, a more practical approach may be for a municipal
transit authority to investigate a PUC certificate holder's asking
427 Pa. 1, 233 A.2d 237 (1967).
Id. at 4, 233 A.2d at 239.
Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A)(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
117. 427 Pa. at 3, 233 A.2d at 239.
118. Id. 4, 233 A.2d at 239.
119. Id.
120. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 4) (discussing
issues raised by Beaver County Transit Authority).
114.
115.
116.
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price and negotiate a purchase price with knowledge of the maximum price it would pay if the rights were taken by eminent
121
domain.
The final issue raised by the facts in the first scenario is whether
a contractual agreement between a municipal authority and a nonPUC certified carrier unfairly competes with an existing service as
proscribed by the UMT Act, thereby jeopardizing the authority's
federal funding and requiring the authority to compensate the existing certified carrier. The purpose of the UMT Act is to improve
urban mass transportation systems by providing financial assistance to mass transportation projects. 12 2 Section 3(e)(3) of the
UMT Act prohibits the grant of financial assistance to any local
public body or agency for the purpose of acquiring transit property
or providing:
for the operation of mass transportation facilities or equipment in competition with, or supplementary to, the service provided by an existing mass
transportation company, unless . . . (3) just and adequate compensation
will be paid to such companies for the acquisition of their franchises or
property to the extent required by applicable State or local laws .... 123

The language of section 3(e)(3) of the UMT Act is significant in
that it defers to state law. Thus, in regard to municipal transit authorities operating in Pennsylvania, it requires application of the
anti-competitive proviso of section 306(A) of the Municipality Authorities Act, which prohibits the duplication of or competition
124
with existing transportation systems.
Although Thompson Appeal provides the authority for acquiring the rights of an existing operator, as a practical matter, a municipal transit authority should, as a first option, seriously consider
negotiating a purchase price with the existing operator. 2 ' In the
121. Id. at 5. There is, however, very little information available that can be used to
establish criteria for the valuation of transit rights. Although it would be difficult to discern
specific criteria for valuation of transit routes, a purchase price may be established by an
appraisal of physical assets. Furthermore, without proof that a holder of dormant rights
made investments in personnel, equipment and other facilities, it is questionable whether
anything other than a nominal payment would be required. Letter from Henry M. Wick to
Bruce W. Ahern (June 20, 1983 at 4-5) (opinion discussing the operation of McCarter
Transit, Inc.).
122. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (1983).
123. Id. § 1602(e)(3)(emphasis added). See supra note 21 and accompanying text and
text following note 22.
124. Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A)(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
125. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 5) (discussing
issues raised by Beaver County Transit Authority).
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event that a municipal authority is unable to negotiate an agreement to buy the existing, dormant rights of a PUC certified carrier,
it is recommended that an authority could initiate operations without violating the anti-competitive proviso of the UMT Act on the
basis that the courts have granted great latitude to public mass
transit agencies under similar circumstances.126 Finally, anonymous conversations with UMTA staff indicate that the "(a)gency
has been required to purchase the existing operating rights of a
certificated carrier in order to institute service on its own. 1 2 7 With
the advent of the UMTA "privatization directive," it is conceivable
that the wide latitude granted public transit operations may be
narrowed since a primary objective of this UMTA policy statement
is to breathe new life into section 3(e) of the UMT Act and to
protect private operators from unnecessary and unwarranted competition with public transit agencies.'
2. Status of PUC Operating Certificates When Holder Contracts
with a Municipal Authority
A second scenario is this: a private operator, P, already possessing PUC certificates covering certain routes within the service area
of public transit authority X, approaches X for the purpose of entering into a contract under which P would provide certain services
on behalf of X. The contract agreement between P and X may
even include service routes for which P does not presently hold
PUC rights.
In accordance with current PUC policy interpretations, a contractual agreement between a municipal transit authority and a
private operator possessing a PUC certificate is permissible, providing the authority exercises pervasive control over the rates and
routes of a carrier and the carrier operates only within X's
chartered service area. 29 In this case, as in the case of a non-PUC
certified holder, the municipal authority is controlling the operation under its statutory authority, so PUC rights are not necessary.'3 0 Under the circumstances, the question arises as to what
126. Id. See Westport Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Adams, 571 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir. 1978); Bradford School Bus Transit v. Chicago Transit Auth., 537 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1976); South
Safeway Lines v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1968).
127. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 5).
128. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1983).
See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
129. Breston v. City of Bradford, 41 Pa. P.U.C. 349, 354 (1964).
130. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman to Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Plan-
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status a PUC certificate assumes during the period that the municipal authority is under contract with the PUC holder to provide
services.
A recent opinion by the chief counsel of the PUC on this issue
indicated that if a private carrier continues to provide service to
the public under its PUC certificate, in addition to those services
that are provided in conjunction with an authority, there would
not appear to be any change in the status of the carrier's PUC
certification. 11 On the other hand, where a private carrier stops
rendering service under its PUC certificate to exclusively devote its
equipment and service to the authority, it is possible that the car13 2
rier may be deemed to have abandoned the PUC certification.
This opinion by the chief counsel appears to be based on PUC
cases which have held that where: (1) a carrier leases or sells his
equipment; (2) does not conduct any PUC certificated operations;
(3) and places itself in a position where it is unable to provide service to the public, abandonment is indicated and a revocation of
the certificate is warranted. 13 However, if a PUC certificate holder
who has contracted with an authority retains its own equipment or
uses its equipment in the authority's operation, it appears that two
legitimate arguments could be made that the carrier has maintained a position where it is still able to render service to the public if such services were requested.
First, the commission, as affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in In re Byerly'3 stated that "[t]o constitute an
abandonment there must be an intention to abandon together with
external acts by which the intention is carried into effect."'' 1 Thus,
if a private carrier expresses an intention to provide PUC certificated operations when such services are requested and in fact continually makes its equipment available, such external acts should
negate any implication that the carrier intended to abandon.
A second argument can be made against a finding of abandonment by invoking the "presumption of continuance doctrine"
which has been adopted by the commission and was reemphasized
ning Commission (Jan. 18, 1985 at 1-2). See Brocal Corp. v. Wheels Inc., Pa. P.U.C., Dckt.
No. C-812799 at 4 (order entered June 16, 1983).
131. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman to Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (Jan. 18, 1985 at 2).
132. Id.
133. Id. See In re Byerly, 440 Pa. 521, 270 A.2d 186 (1970); see also Application of
Donald E. Becker, 32 Pa. P.U.C. 601 (1954).
134. 440 Pa. 521, 270 A.2d 186 (1970).
135. Id. at 525-26, 270 A.2d at 189.
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by the court in Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Pennsylvania PUC. 36
In Morgan Drive Away, the commonwealth court stated that,
"[o]nce continuing need has been established it continues to exist,
unless it is clearly rebutted."' 31, Therein, the court determined that
the "presumption of continuance doctrine" is not rebutted by simply advancing that the rights of a certificated holder were dormant."8' The commonwealth court, quoting the language of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Byerly, stated, "[t]he fact that a
carrier has not transported the certificated product and the fact
that he has not been requested to do so does not rebut the presumption of continuing necessity."' 39 In determining that dormancy did not rebut the presumption and that the carrier "continued to hold himself open for business", the court held that a
40
finding of abandonment was unwarranted.1
Thus, a carrier's certification should not be deemed abandoned
simply because the carrier has contracted with an authority and is
not currently providing certificated services. Although both Byerly
and Morgan Drive Away involved the transfer of certificates of
public convenience it would seem illogical for the commission to
adopt a different abandonment analysis in the context of a certificate holder who has contracted with a municipal authority.
Rather than risk revocation of their license to operate, PUC cetificate holders may prefer that their certificates be suspended during the time that they are under contract with a public transit authority. In a letter from the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (PaDOT) Office of Chief Counsel to the Public
Utility Commission, an assistant counsel to PaDOT stated:
[m]ost private operators are unwilling to give up P.U.C. rights to their
traditional routes as a cost of doing business with public transit authorities.
This is especially true where the private operator is unsure whether their
annual contract with a public transit authority will be renewed. In many
cases, public transit authorities in rural areas are marginal, publically
funded operations which may close their doors after several years of service
because of funding or organizational problems. In these cases, the private
operators' fears are understandable. " '

Since private carriers are understandably concerned about the loss
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

6 Pa Commw. 229, 293 A.2d 895 (1972).
Id. at 233, 293 A.2d at 897.
Id., 293 A.2d at 896-97.
Id., 293 A.2d at 897, quoting In re Byerly, 440 Pa. at 522, 270 A.2d at 189.
Id. at 234, 293 A.2d at 897.
Letter from Gareth W. Rosenau to Charles F. Hoffman (Oct. 29, 1982 at 1) (dis-

cussing private operator contracts/loss of PUC rights).

1178

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:1151

of a valuable asset, PaDOT's Office of Chief Counsel proposed to
the PUC a procedure whereby a carrier's certificate would be
merely suspended during that time period in which the carrier had
contracted with an authority, and, it could then be reinstated upon
42
a simplified filing.1
Although the PUC has not responded to this proposal, there is
one opinion in which a certificated carrier was granted a temporary
suspension of a certificate. In In Re Carriage Tours, Inc.,14 the
commission granted a request for a suspension with the qualification that the carrier report to the commission at the conclusion of
a pending court action. At that time the commission would then
consider reinstatement or revocation of the suspended certificate. 144 A statement by the Chief Council to the PUC suggests that
this case "presents a possibility of similar action for carriers devoting exclusive service to a municipal authority."""
Another issue arising under the second scenario involves the
powers created by a contractual agreement between a private operator and a municipal authority on routes where the private carrier
held no PUC certificated operational rights prior to the contract. It
is clear under this set of facts that, in order for the private carrier
to operate legally, the municipal authority must exercise pervasive
control over the private carrier's rates, routes and service characteristics.' 4" Thus, on those routes located outside of the PUC certificated operational area of the private carrier but within the lawful service area of the authority, the carrier need not hold a PUC
certificate since the carrier is operating under the aegis of the authority. As such, the exempt status of the municipal authority
would control.14 7 In this particular section of the service area of the
authority, the private carrier would be treated as a non-PUC certificate holder and upon termination of the contract, the carrier
would hold no operating rights.
142. Letter from Gareth W. Rosenau to the Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional
Planning Commission (Sept. 26, 1984 at 1) (discussing SPRPC's requested clarification of
four specific issues regarding transportation services).
143.

51 Pa. P.U.C. 25 (1977).

144.

Id.

145. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman to Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (Jan. 18, 1985 at 2).
146.

Id. at 1-2.

147.

Id. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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1 48
3. ContractsBetween a Non-Operating
Municipal Transit Authority and a Non-PUC Certified Carrier

A third scenario is this: a transit operator, T, who possesses no
PUC certificates of operation covering routes within the service
area of the non-operating municipal transit authority X, approaches X for the purpose of entering into a contract under which
T would provide certain services on behalf of X within X's legal
service area.
The Public Utility Commission, by its Order in Application of
McCarter Transit, Inc.,'4 9 provides cautionary language to the effect that a municipal authority, as a non-operating entity, must use
carriers certificated by the commission.1 50 Although this issue was
not before it, the commission felt compelled to expound thereon
because the applicant intended to provide future services over local routes within the jurisdiction of the authority. McCarter
Transit contended that because such services would occur wholly
within the jurisdiction of the authority, no certification from the
commission would be necessary.1 51 In McCarter, the commission
reminded both parties that "the . . . Transit Authority is a nonoperating entity and since no service will actually be provided by
the entity itself, the carriers it selects to provide service must be
appropriately certificated. 1 '6 5 The essence of the commission's position was that a non-operating municipal transit authority could
not lawfully contract with a non-PUC certificated carrier for the
1 3
purpose of leasing equipment and drivers.
One exception to this rule can be found in Chappell v. Pennsylvania PUC, 5 4 which held generally that the commission has no jurisdiction over carriers transporting persons, in specially equipped
vehicles, who are traveling to and from medical facilities.' 55 The
148. A non-operating authority contracts with other entities to perform services on
behalf of the authority. See also supra note 88.
149. Pa. P.U.C., Dckt. No. A-00103585 at 5 (order entered Mar. 1, 1983).
150. Id. A grant of certification by this order enabled the applicant (McCarter) and
the non-operating transit authority to initiate contractual arrangements so the applicant
could operate this segment of its service as an essential part of the transit authority's operation. Id. at 4.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce E. Woodske and Bruce W. Ahern (June 20,
1983 at 2) (discussing issue raised by the Beaver County Transit Authority).
154. 57 Pa. Commw. 17, 425 A.2d 873 (1981).
155. Id. at 23, 425 A.2d at 876. See also Triage, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Util.
Comm'n, 69 Pa. Commw. 230, 450 A.2d 790 (1982).
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commission's entry control division chief interpreted this holding
to suggest that a non-operating authority does not have to use
15
commission certified carriers when contracting for this service. 1
The exception, however, is limited. "[Ilt appears that with the sole
exception of transportation to and from medical facilities in specially equipped vehicles, any carrier . . . [contracted] as a [nonoperating municipal] county transit authority to provide service
'157
would require authority from . . . [the] . . . Commission.
However, in an opinion prepared for the Beaver County Transit
Authority, it is asserted that there is no case law deciding whether
a non-operating municipal authority must use PUC certificated
carriers; that the McCarter order only provides cautionary language; and, that it is still questionable as to how a court might rule
on the issue. 158 Relying upon the general powers of the Municipality Authorities Act that a municipal authority should be exempt
from commission regulation, this legal opinion concludes that there
is no distinction of substance between services rendered by an authority which has contracted with a certificated carrier for the use
of the authority's equipment and drivers, and services rendered by
an authority through a contractual agreement for the use of a noncertificated carrier's equipment and drivers.' 5 Thus, "[it is possible that a court could broadly interpret the exemption granted to
municipal authorities as totally removing Commission jurisdiction
over any form of transportation, without regard to whether the
equipment [used in the authority's operation] is owned or
leased."' 6 0
4.

The Port Authority of Allegheny County (PAT)

Transit authorities derive their specific functions by enabling
legislation, and PAT derives its authority from the Second Class
County Port Authority Act. 6 ' Under the Port Authority Act, PAT
has plenary jurisdiction over all public transportation within Allegheny County and the authority to operate such services as lessor
156. Letter from Barry L. Ernst to Bruce W. Ahern (Mar. 10, 1982 at 2) (discussing
numerous "gray areas" of regulatory policy).
157. Id.
158. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce E. Woodske Esq. and Bruce W. Ahern
(June 20, 1983 at 1-2).
159. Id. at 2.
160. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 8).
161. Second Class County Port Authority Act, Act of April 6, 1956, Pub. L. No. 1414,
as amended, 55 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 551 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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or lessee. 1 62 Section 553 of the Act provides that "[elach authority
shall be for the purpose of . . .operating . . .either as lessor or
lessee . . . a transportation system . .1." and that "[t]he authority shall determine by itself exclusively, the facilities to be operated by it and the services to be available to the public."' 6 " In vesting PAT with exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation system
within Allegheny County, section 563.1 of the Act explicitly divests
the PUC of jurisdiction over the "transportation system within the
service area of the authority."' 65 Along these lines, the term "service area" is defined to mean "the entire county incorporating the
authority"' 66 and the term "transportation system" has been defined to only exclude taxicabs and school buses."6 "
A fourth scenario is this: the public transit authority (PAT),
which holds no PUC certificates of operation, has decided to discontinue its own service on a particular route because the route is
no longer economically feasible. PAT has determined, however,
that the service should be continued for the benefit of the public
living within the general area.
Several sub-issues are presented in determining whether PAT
can contract with another entity to provide service along the discontinued route. First, is it lawful for PAT to contract with a nonoperating municipal transit authority to provide such service, when
it is between points within the jurisdictions of both authorities?
An argument could be made that such a contract is lawful. The
Pennsylvania Legislature created the Port Authority for the purpose of providing Allegheny County with a unified and integrated
transportation system. 168 Furthermore, section 553 of the Port Authority Act directs PAT to exercise the right "[t]o fix, alter, charge
and collect fares, rates, rentals and other charges for its facilities
• . .[and to] determine by itself exclusively, the facilities to be operated by it and the services to be available to the public.' 6 9 Thus,
the commission would have no jurisdiction over such a contractual
agreement so long as the operation in question remained totally
within the legal geographical service area of PAT and the legal ge162. Id. §§ 552, 553(a), 553(b)(9), 563.1. See Port Authority of Allegheny County v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 494 Pa. 250, 431 A. 2d 243 (1981).
163. Port Authority Act, 55 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 553(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
164. Id. § 553(b)(9).
165. Id. § 563.1.
166. Id. § 552(17).
167. Id. § 552(13).
168. Id. § 563.1.
169. Id. § 553(b)(9).
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ographical service area of the adjacent municipal transit authority.170 This argument highlights the fact that the commission
would not have jurisdiction over that portion of the proposed
transit service operating in Allegheny County. This is because the
Port Authority Act vests PAT with exclusive authority over the
transportation system in its particular area, while the portion of
the transit service performed in the adjacent county would also be
exempt from commission jurisdiction by powers vested in that
county's transit authority under the Municipality Authorities
Act.17 1 This argument, of course, places more weight on the jurisdictional aspect of the scenario and less weight on the issue of
whether the equipment is owned or leased.
In an opinion by the commission's chief of entry control division,
two arguments were presented to support the commission's position that such a contractual arrangement would violate the Public
Utility Code. The commission's first argument was based upon its
position that a non-operating transit authority could only contract
with PUC certificated operators for the purpose of providing services.1 72 The commission further contended that because PAT was
not a PUC certified operator, it would be illegal for a non-operating authority to contract with PAT for the purpose of leasing
equipment and drivers. 7.
The commission's second argument that such a contractual
agreement between PAT and an adjacent municipal transit authority would be violative of the Public Utility Code was directed at a
limitation placed on PAT's authority by section 563.1 of the Port
Authority Act. The limitation states that "[tihe . . . Public Utility
Commission shall continue to have jurisdiction, with respect to all
matters regarding those transportation systems and group and
party rights to operate into or out of said [PAT's] service area. 1 7
This argument, based on the fact that the contracted for route
goes beyond PAT's jurisdiction, could be averted by PAT's plan of
an integrated system. Section 553(a) of the Port Authority Act
states that "[e]ach authority shall be for the purpose of. . . leas170. Letter from Henry M. Wick to Bruce W. Ahern (May 28, 1982 at 8).
171. Id.
172. Application of McCarter Transit, Inc., Pa. PUC, Dckt. No. A-00103585 at 5 (order entered Mar. 1, 1983).
173. Letter from Barry L. Ernst to Bruce W. Ahern (Mar. 10, 1982 at 1) (discussing
numerous "gray areas" of regulatory policy).
174. Second Class County Port Authority Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 1414, as amended,
55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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ing, either as lessor or lessee . . . a transportation system in the
county by which it is incorporated and outside of the county to the
1 75
extent necessary for the establishment of an integratedsystem.'
The Act then requires, in section 563.1, that "[t]he authority, immediately upon its organization . . .shall prepare a plan of integrated operation showing the service area and the pattern of its
integrated system. . . [and] shall, thereafter, have the right to
make such changes in the pattern of its integrated system as it

may deem proper.

.

.

. M

Thus, while there does not appear to be

precedent for such contracts, the power to amend does exist in the
Act and could conceivably be used as a means to establish a contractual agreement between PAT and transit operators in areas adjacent to the incorporated county.
Although there are several arguments on both sides as to
whether regular bus service could be established on a route between connecting points in Allegheny County and an adjacent
county which falls within the jurisdictional area of a municipal
transit authority, it is interesting to note that in Port Authority of
77
Allegheny County v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,1
the court allowed municipal authorities to contract with PAT to
provide vanpool services. In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that vehicles not reserved for individual use
were not considered a taxicab service; that PAT had exclusive jurisdiction over such vehicles within Allegheny County; and, that
the PUC had been completely divested of jurisdiction over such
vehicles in Allegheny County.'7 8 Further, with regard to a vanpool
operation, the court clearly established the legality of a contractual
agreement between PAT and an adjacent municipal transit authority because PUC certification for that portion of the service operating in Allegheny County was deemed no longer a viable concern of
175. Id. § 553(a) (emphasis added).
176. Id. § 563.1. It appears that section 563.1 provides for agreements between PAT
and transit operators in areas adjacent to the incorporated county if such arrangements are
defined in the plan of integrated operation:
The authority shall have the exclusive right to operate. . . within the service area as
set forth in the plan . . . except for those transportation systems, operating into the
said service area from points outside of said area, which companies shall have the
right to pick up and discharge passengers destined to and from the territory outside
the said area but not the right to pick up and discharge passengers entirely within the
service area.
Id. The 88 Transit Lines, Inc. is an example of such a transportation system operating into
Allegheny County. Letter from S. Berne Smith to Aldo Nones (Jan 14, 1985 at 1).
177. 494 Pa. 250, 431 A.2d 243 (1981).
178. Id. at 259, 431 A.2d at 248.
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the commission.
Regarding the circumstances in the fourth scenario, another issue which arises when the operating rights for the discontinued
route is placed up for bids from private carriers.'" 9 Because the
PUC cannot issue certificates of operation in Allegheny County,
private carriers bidding for PAT operating rights would possess no
PUC certificate of operation for Allegheny County. The problem
presented under these facts is whether PAT has authority under
the Port Authority Act to provide service within its incorporated
county (Allegheny) under contract with such private carriers?
Clearly the answer to this question is yes.
As discussed earlier, PAT is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
over the transportation system within Allegheny County. 8 ' Its legislative purpose is to provide a unified and integrated transportation system in Allegheny County.' 8' Moreover, it is directed to determine the facilities to be operated by it and the services to be
available to the public.'8 2 Thus, PAT has the authority to contract
with non-PUC certified public carriers. However, as previously discussed, it must exercise pervasive control over the rates and routes
of any such carriers. 183
With regard to this scenario, the concept of providing transit
service under contract with private carriers is a very sensitvie labor
issue in the transit industry. First, according to a Demonstration
Design Study,'1 4 there are no provisions in the authority's labor
agreements with its union which prohibit contracting for ser179. For the first time in its 22-year history, the Port Authority Transit will accept
bids from private operators to run mini-bus shuttle service on routes in Allegheny County
for an 18-month experimental period in 1986. The plan, prepared by Mellon Institute, recommends Monroeville for this low density transit service demonstration project because it is
a major center of activity and has a single corridor of bus routes into the central business
district and the Oakland districts of Pittsburgh. This neighborhood shuttle service would
follow fixed routes and feed into regular PAT truck routes, using leased vans or buses with
15-25 seats. PAT to Seek Private Help on Routes, Pgh. Post-Gazette, July 26, 1985, at 1,
cols. 2 & 3. Service in these low density, fringe service areas is not efficiently provided by
the authority because the cost per bus-hour is nearly the same in lower density areas as
higher density corridors and since ridership is low, the cost per rider served, a key measure
of efficiency, is much higher in the low density areas. Low Density Service Methods Demonstration Design Study, prepared for Port Authority of Allegheny County by Mellon Institute, at 5 (June, 1985) [hereinafter Mellon Study].
180. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
182. Port Authority Act of 1956, 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 553(b)(9) (Purdon Supp.
1986).
183. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
184. Mellon Study, supra note 179, at 8.
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vices.' 8 5 In fact, the Second Class County Port Authority Act,
seems to contemplate such contracting for services."8 '
However, an attempt to substitute existing bus service on low
density service routes must comply with section 13(c) of the UMT
Act which provides that transit agencies receiving federal funds
must protect the interests of employees including, but not limited
to, the preservation of rights, privileges and benefits under existing
collective bargaining agreements and protection against a worsening of their employment positions. 187 The Port Authority Act, in
fact, appears to reflect these protective measures in its employeremployee relations provision. 188
A review of the Demonstration Design Study indicates that PAT
would have basically two arguments to support a contention that
placing low density service routes up for bid is not detrimental to
existing labor contracts and thus not violative of the UMT Act,
section 13(c) protections. First, the demonstration plan recommends opening the bidding process to the Authority's work force,
noting that the labor union may be willing to negotiate a lower
wage scale since the service would involve the operation of smaller
vehicles.' 8 9 Secondly, assuming the service on low density routes
was contracted to private carriers, it is entirely possible that more
riders would be fed into the trunk routes of the regional bus system and, in fact, benefit the authority's labor force.'l 0 Thus, if the
attempt to provide service on low density routes through the use of
private contracts has no detrimental effect on union labor, there is
no section 13(c) labor protection issue. But, if such services would
adversely effect local labor agreements, a public transit agency
which is a direct recipient of federal funds from UMTA may be in
violation of section 13(c).
Another issue with regard to this fourth scenario arises when
PAT decides to discontinue its own service on a route, defined as
part of the integrated system plan, located outside the incorporated county, and determines to place the operating rights up for
bid, for the purpose of contracting with a private carrier. Accord185. Id.
186. Port Authority Act of 1956, 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 559.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
Examples of such contracts for private service are the B & 0 commuter rail operation,
Shortway Suburban, Lincoln Lines, and the Access contracts. See Mellon Study, supra note
179, at 8.
187. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1983).
188. 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
189. Mellon Study, supra note 179, at 1-2.
190. Id. at 8-9.
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ing to section 563.1 of the Port Authority Act, the authority, upon
its organization, could provide service to areas outside the incorporated county if such service areas were defined in the integrated
operation plan filed with the PUC. 19 1 Because areas lying outside
the incorporated county are defined as part of the integrated transportation system, PAT would acquire exclusive rights to provide
transit services, with one exception:
[t]hat if the authority [PAT] shall at any time desire to abandon or change
any portion of a transportation system outside the territorial limits of the
county incorporating the authority, the approval for such abandonment or
change must be secured by the authority from the Pennsylvania Public
2
Utility Commission. '

One of the major difficulties which could be anticipated, if PAT
attempted to contract with a private carrier to provide service on
an integrated system route located outside the boundaries of the
incorporated county, focuses on whether such a contract constitutes a change to the transportation system so as to require approval from the PUC. Since the selection of a private carrier would
inevitably involve the solicitation of bids, one might conclude that
the use of the bidding process may constitute such a material
change that it would require approval by the PUC. An informal
opinion of the PUC indicates that "[tlhe 'bidding process' is foreign to the philosophical principles of utility regulation." ' Thus if
the PUC were in fact, to view the bidding process for the selection
of a private carrier as repulsive to the Public Utility Code, it appears that section 563.1 of the Port Authority Act provides the
PUC with sufficient authority to disapprove such changes to the
transportation system occurring outside of Allegheny County.
On the other hand, section 563.1 further states that "nothing in
this section . . . shall prevent.

. .

an undertaking

.

. .

by the au-

thority of any demonstration, test or experimental project relevant
to, and necessary for, the establishment of an integrated transportation system."1 9 Under this provision, the Authority could argue
that such contractual agreements with private carriers is relevant
and necessary to the operation of an integrated system.
191.

55 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 563.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).

192.

Id. (emphasis added).

193.

Letter from Barry L. Ernst to Bruce W. Ahern (Mar. 10, 1982 at 2) (discussing

numerous "gray areas" of regulatory policy) (emphasis omitted).
194. 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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Independent Operations by Private Carriers

Assuming that PAT could overcome the bidding process hurdle
presented above, a question arises as to whether PAT would maintain its exclusive rights to provide service on integrated system
routes located outside the boundaries of the incorporated county
where PAT has contracted with a private carrier.
As was discussed previously under the first scenario, an existing
certified private carrier may independently continue operating in
the same service area where a municipal authority has contracted
with a non-certified carrier if the new service to be provided by the
Authority does not serve substantially the same purposes as the
existing enterprise. According to the chief counsel for the PUC,
nothing in the Municipality Authorities Act or the Public Utility
Code would prevent the existing carrier from continuing to operate.' 9 5 Note, however, that operations in Allegheny County are governed by the Second Class County Port Authority Act, with different results.' 9 It is clear, that in the situation where PAT contracts
with a private carrier to provide service on integrated system
routes located solely within the boundaries of the incorporated
county, that PAT would maintain the exclusive right to provide
services. No independent private carrier could be granted a certifi1 97
cate of operation to provide services by the PUC.
In the hypothetical where PAT contracts with a private carrier
to provide service on routes located outside the boundaries of the
incorporated county, it is unclear whether PAT retains its exclusive operating rights so as to preclude independent operations by
private carriers providing services in the same general area. As explained earlier, the PUC has the authority, on routes located
outside the incorporated county, to approve or disapprove
changes.' Since PAT's operating rights are obviously not exclusive with regard to these extraterritorial routes, an argument could
be made that independent operations by private carriers would not
violate the Port Authority Act. According to the PUC's chief counsel, nothing in the Public Utility Code would preclude independent
195. Letter from Charles F. Hoffman to Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission (Jan. 18, 1985 at 3) (discussing SPRPC's requested clarification of four
specific issues regarding transportation services).
196. Letter from Gareth W. Rosenau to the Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional
Planning Commission (Sept. 26, 1984 at 2) (discussing SPRPC's requested clarification of
four specific issues regarding transportation services).
197. See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
198. 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).

1188

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:1151

operations.199
The final question on this subject is whether the exclusive rights
granted PAT under the Port Authority Act preclude continued independent operations by a carrier who holds certificates of operation over a route on which PAT may contract with private carriers
to provide service. With regard to operational rights granted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), it is clear that PAT has
no authority over those transportation systems subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.2 0 0 Thus, it is unlikely that PAT would have the
authority to preclude independent operations by carriers certificated by the ICC, regardless of whether the routes were located
within or without PAT's incorporated county. Considering the fact
that the Bus Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA) substantially
changed the entry procedures of the ICC,20 1 the independent operations of an ICC certificate holder has become a real concern. In
general the BRRA is based on a presumption that increased competition benefits the public; allows carriers to apply to the ICC for
both interstate and intrastate authority; removes "closed-door" restrictions that bar service to intermediate points on existing intercity routes; and establishes a new entry provision, shifting the burden of proving that the issuance of a certificate will not benefit the
public interest to the party protesting the application. 02
Section 3(e)(3) of the UMT Act, prohibits the grant of financial
assistance to any public agency for the purpose of providing mass
transportation "in competition with. . . service provided by an existing mass transportation company, unless . . . just and adequate
compensation will be paid . . . to the extent required by applicable State or local laws. . ."03 This provision, which defers to
state laws, requires recognition of Port Authority Act section 563.1
which authorized PAT upon its inception to acquire by purchase,
lease or condemnation any existing transportation systems necessary to the development of an integrated system of mass
transportation.
The acquisition of existing transportation systems by PAT occurred in the early stage of its organization and such acquisition
efforts appear to have been directed to the establishment of an in199.
Planning
200.
201.
202.
203.

Letter from Charles F. Hoffman to the Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional
Commission (Jan. 18, 1985 at 3).
55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
Fravel, supra note 38, at 43.
49 U.S.C. § 1602(e)(3).
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tegrated system rather than the prevention of unfair competition
between a public transit authority and a private operator. This observation is documented by the numerous references within the
Port Authority Act to an integrated system and the absence of any
anti-competition proviso such as that contained within the Municipality Authorities Act.2 04 The most obvious explanation for this
discrepancy is that the Port Authority Act, unlike the Municipality
Authorities Act, grants PAT exclusive operating rights within its
jurisdiction and thus precludes any concern for unfair competition.
However, the issue of unfair competition becomes a serious concern in those service areas where PAT may contract with a private
carrier and where independent services are provided by a carrier
holding a certificate of operation from the ICC. If the circumstances indicate that the private carrier under contract with PAT,
a recipient of federal funds, creates a situation of "unfair competition", it could be argued that section 3(e) of the UMT Act becomes
applicable and would require the authority to compensate the ICC
20 5
certificate holder.
C.

Other Potential Points of Conflict Between the BRRA and
Pennsylvania Enabling Legislation

The following paragraphs of this Comment highlight several potential areas of conflict between the Bus Regulatory Reform Act,
the Public Utility Code, the Second Class County Port Authority
Act, and the Municipality Authorities Act.
1. Municipality Authorities Act v. the BRRA: Two Standardsfor
Measuring Competition
As was discussed in the first scenario of this Comment, when a
municipal transit authority contracts with a non-PUC certified carrier, the paramount issue presented is whether these new services
will duplicate an existing service provided by a PUC certified carrier. In order to answer this question, attention was directed to the
anti-competition proviso of section 306(A) of the Municipality Authorities Act which prohibits the duplication of, or competition
with, existing transit systems.20 6 In Para Transit Corp. v. County
204.
205.
206.

See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
49 U.S.C. § 1602(e)(3).
Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(A) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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of Monroe,210 the commonwealth court, in interpreting the section
306(A) standard, determined that where new services are distinct
and satisfy a different community need, the new services do not
serve substantially the same purpose as an existing service and
thus, do not duplicate or compete with the existing enterprise. 8
In the event that the non-certified carrier decides not to provide
services as an agent of the municipal transit authority, but seeks to
provide services on its own by securing a certificate of operation
for regular route service from the ICC,2 °9 the PUC certificated carrier must now challenge the new service under the public interest
standard of the BRRA.21 0 In regard to the impairment test of the
BRRA's public interest standards, the protestant is required to
show that the new service would impair its own ability to continue
operating over a substantial portion of its entire regular-route system. 21 It should be noted here that the impairment test is only
one prong of the standard to be used to determine if an application
is consistent with the public interest 2 12 and each factor is to be
given equal weight and balanced when making this public interest
determination.2 1 3
Several observations can be made about these two hypothetical
situations. First, in Para Transit Corporation,where the municipal transit authority's creation of a scheduled route service allegedly competed with petitioner's demand taxicab service and paratransit service, the court's inquiry into whether the new service
was distinct or satisfied a different community need was appropriate since the competing services were different types of transportation.2 1" It would appear that when the competing interests involve
the same type of transportation, such as regular route bus service,
the Para Transit Corporation test may be difficult to apply. The
impairment test of BRRA, however, would be a much more useful
tool to determine if the new and existing services are overly
207. 79 Pa. Commw. 104, 468 A.2d 548 (1983).
208. Id. at 106, 468 A.2d at 550.
209. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(2)(B), 96 Stat.
1102, 1104 (1982).
210. Id. § 6(c)(3), 96 Stat. 1102, 1105-1106.
211. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications for Operating Authority - Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62, at 68 (1982). See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
212. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, §6(c)(3), 96 Stat. 1102,
1105-1106 (1982).
213. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Applications for Operating Authority - Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62, at 68-69 (1982). See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying
text.
214. 79 Pa. Commw. at 105, 468 A.2d at 549 (1983).
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competitive.
Second, the anti-competition proviso of the Municipality Authorities Act is primarily concerned with protecting existing businesses and deterring competition, while the impairment test of the
BRRA is primarily interested in protecting the public by allowing
private carriers to compete. In support of this observation, attention is directed to that section of the Municipality Authorities Act
which states that the purpose of the Act is "not to unnecessarily
burden or interfere with existing business by the establishment of
competitive enterprises .
*."..On the other hand, a recent Interstate Commerce Commission decision states that:
[u]nder the provisions of the BRRA, competitive transportationservice is
encouraged and a carrier is allowed the flexibility to conduct its operations
in response to market demands....
It is axiomatic that authorization of a competitive service would result
in the loss of some traffic from existing carriersand impact on their operations ... [but] the benefits which normally accrue from a competitive ser21
vice . . .are readily apparent.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the potential for inconsistent results depending upon whether an existing carrier is challenging services to be provided by an agent of a municipal transit
authority or challenging a carrier who is seeking to provide services
under the auspices of the ICC. Since the Municipality Authorities
Act is more interested in guarding against duplicate services, it is
conceivable that an existing carrier, attempting to protect its business enterprise, would be more likely to succeed in a suit against
the transit authority. This is because a suit challenging the ICC's
issuance of an application for new services would place greater emphasis on the public interest to be served and would, therefore,
more probably produce a different result.
2. Public Utility Code vs. the BRRA: Entry and Exit Policy
Modifications
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA) of 1982 was designed
to ease entry as well as exit requirements for private carriers providing regular-route transit service.2 17 Most significantly, the new
entry provisions are intended to stimulate the interests of private
215. Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 382, as amended, 53 PA. CONS.
§ 306(A)(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
216. MSP Express, I.C.C. Common Carrier Application Decision, Dckt. No. MC180344, at 4-5 (June 6, 1985) (emphasis added).
217. Fravel, supra note 38, at 38.
STAT. ANN.
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carriers 2 a by making entry into the bus transportation system easier under the BRRA than it was under the Motor Carrier Act of
1980.219 The new exit provision is intended to establish an appeals
procedure to the ICC which preempts the state's regulatory authority220 and allows private carriers to abandon routes which are
clearly unprofitable. This, in turn, would allow 'private carriers to
devote their resources to areas where there is a greater demand for
service. 221
In Pennsylvania, regulatory authority for the issuance of certificates of operation for carriers to provide transit services is controlled by the PUC. 22 2 Following the enactment of the BRRA and a
change in the ICC's policy, the PUC adopted and made final those
requirements used in adjudicating motor common carrier applications.22 3 Policy statements published by the PUC indicate that it
believes the evidentiary requirements existing prior to the change
were derived from a "monopoly" theory of regulation. Thus, those
standards were inappropriate with respect to motor carriers because they were very protective of existing carriers and restrained
healthy competition.2 2 ' In light of these realizations, the PUC has
altered the third prong of its three part test (for granting common
carrier authority) by eliminating the applicant's burden of showing
the inadequacy of the existing service.2 25 Under the third prong of
the modified test, the protestant has the burden of showing that
the entry of a new carrier would impair the operation of an ex218. Id. at 43.
219. Ex Parte, No. 55 (Sub-No. 56), Application for Operating Authority - Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62 at 68 (1982).
220. Fravel, supra note 38, at 38.
221. Id. at 38-39.
222. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101 (Purdon 1978 & Supp. 1984).
223. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. No. 51, Dec. 18, 1982 at 4282. The evidentiary criteria used
to decide motor common carrier applications read in pertinent part:
(a) An applicant seeking motor common carrier authority has a burden of demonstrating that approval of the application will serve a useful public purpose ....
(b) An applicant seeking motor common carrier authority has the burden of demonstrating that it possesses the technical and financial ability to provide the proposed
service . ...
(c) The Commission will grant motor common carrier authority commensurate with
the demonstrated public need unless it is established that the entry of a new carrier
into the field would endanger or impair the operations of existing common carriers
to such an extent that, on balance, the granting of authority would be contrary to the
public interest.
52 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 41.14 (Shepard's 1985) (emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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isting carrier to such an extent that, on balance, the issuance
of the
22 6
application would be contrary to the public interest.
Several observations can be made about the PUC's modification
of the third prong of its motor carrier entry test in comparison
with the impairment prong of the public interest test established
by the BRRA.22 7 First, both tests shift the burden of proof to those
protecting the issuance of a new application. 28 Second, the third
prong of the PUC entry test requires the PUC to balance the impairment to an existing carrier and the effect on the public interest, while section 6(c)(3) of the BRRA directs the ICC to consider
four factors when considering if an application is consistent with
the public interest. These factors are to be given equal weight and
balanced when making the public interest determination. 229 Third,
with reference to a clear intent to advance the public interest, both
impairment tests establish a strong presumption that increased
competition will benefit the public. The national transportation
policy section of the BRRA encourages competitive transportation
services in order to improve and maintain a sound private motor
carrier system. 2 0 The PUC has also recently commented that it
has a duty to keep its entry policy attuned to the competitive atmosphere advocated by the federal government and, that although,
in the past, it had sought to further the public interest by protecting carriers from competition, this protection was only
a means to
21
paramount.
now
is
convenience
public
The
an end.
Although the PUC's new evidentiary standard and corresponding policy statements appear to be attuned to advancing the competitive spirit of the BRRA thus making it easier for motor common carriers to secure authority, there are limits to the PUC's
flexibility. 2 2 In Application of McCarter Transit,233 decided only
226. Id. Compare the test applied in B.B. Motor Carrier, Inc. v. Pa. Public Utility
Commission, 36 Pa. Commw. 26, 389 A.2d 210 (1978) with the modified test described in 52
Pa. Admin. Code § 41.14 (Shepard's 1985). See supra note 223.
227. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
228. Compare 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. No. 51, Dec. 18, 1982 at 4282 with Bus Regulatory
Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(c)(3), 96 Stat. 1102, 1106 (1982) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 10922(c)(3) (1982)).
229. Compare PA. ADMIN. CODE § 41.14 (Shepard's 1985) with Ex Parte No. 55 (SubNo. 56), Applications for Operating Authority - Motor Passenger Carriers, 133 M.C.C. 62, 68
(1982).
230. Bus Regulatory Reform Act 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 5(a)(2)(G), 96 Stat. 1102,
1103 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a) (1982)).
231. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. No. 51, Dec. 18, 1982 at 4283.
232. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
233. Application of McCarter Transit, Inc., Pa. P.U.C. Dckt. No. A-00103585 at 5 (or-

1194

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:1151

two months after PUC issued the policy statement which indicated
that it intended to follow the spirit of the BRRA and the lead of
the ICC, the PUC made it quite clear that a municipal authority,
as a non-operating entity, must use carriers certified by the commission.2 4 The PUC's adherence to this requirement, however, is a
major barrier to the entry of new carriers and is certainly contradictory to both the competitive spirit of the BRRA and the recent
modification to PUC policy.
In Pennsylvania, regulatory authority over the discontinuance of
transit services is controlled by the PUC in basically two situations. First, the PUC is authorized to approve the abandonment of
all motor carriers who have been issued a PUC certificate of public
convenience.2 5 Second, the PUC has authority to approve abandonments of certain service routes being operated by PAT which
are located outside the territorial limits of the incorporated county
as defined by the integrated system plan.2 36 Regardless of whether
the petitioner is a private carrier holding a PUC certificate of operation or whether it is PAT seeking to abandon a route located
outside the incorporated county, the PUC, in determining whether
to grant a discontinuance, applies a public interest test. This test
essentially requires that an abandonment should not be detrimental to the "service, accommodations, convenience, or safety of the
public. ' 2 37 In making a determination as to whether an abandonment of service will be detrimental to the public interest, the PUC
der entered Mar. 1, 1983). See also supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
234. Pa. P.U.C., Dckt. No. A-00103585 at 5 (order entered Mar. 1, 1983).
235. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(2) (Purdon 1978). Section
1102(a)(2) of the Code provides in part:
Enumeration of acts requiring certificate
(a) General rule. - Upon the application of any public utility and the approval of such
application by the commission, .

it shall be lawful:

(2) For any public utility to abandon or surrender, in whole or in part, any service
Id.
236.

Second Class County Port Authority Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 1414, as amended,

55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.1. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
237. Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(a) (Purdon Supp. 1978). Sec-

tion 1103(a) of the Code provides in part:
Procedure to obtain certificates of public convenience
(a) General rule. -. . .A certificate of public convenience shall be granted by order of
the commission, only if the commission shall find or determine that the granting of
such certificate is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, or safety of the
public.
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may consider: "the use of the service by the public; the prospects
as to future use by the public; the hardship to the public if service
23 8
were discontinued; and the availability of alternative service.
Two observations can be made about the abandonment test applied by the PUC and the ICC under the new exit provision of the
BRRA. First, the BRRA requires that a protestant must demonstrate that the discontinuance will result in an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.2 9 The applicant, seeking to abandon
a PUC certificate of operation, has the burden of showing that the
discontinuance of service will not harm the public interest.24 Second, the BRRA directs the ICC, in making a determination of
whether a discontinuance should be granted, to place "great
weight" on the extent to which revenues from the service are less
than the variable costs of the service.2 4 1 The Public Utility Code
and the aforementioned abandonment factors, on the other hand,
apparently contain no such considerations with regard to a determination for the discontinuance of service.
These comparisons between the abandonment test employed
under the BRRA and the public Utility Code highlight a basic inconsistency between the federal and state legislation with regard to
exit policy. Since the Public Utility Code is apparently more interested in guarding the public interest when evaluating an applicant's request for discontinuance of service, it is more difficult for
a carrier to abandon routes which may be unprofitable. Conversely,
the "great weight" directive of the BRRA's new exit provision
which focuses on a comparison of revenues generated and variable
costs expended on the route, highlights the unprofitability aspect
of continued service and thus makes it easier for a carrier to acquire abandonment approval.
Yet, BRRA's new exit provision also contains a preemption
clause which allows the ICC to grant a private carrier a discontinuance of service if the route to be abandoned is part of an interstate
route; if the petitioner shows its variable costs exceed the revenues;
and, if the petitioner makes initial application to the state regula238. Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 82 Pa. Commw. 13, 18,
474 A.2d 1203, 1206, (1984). See also Commuters' Comm. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 170 Pa. Super. 596, 604-05, 88 A.2d 420, 424 (1952).
239. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 16(e)(1)(A), 96 Stat.
1102, 1115 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(e)(1)(A) (1982)).
240. Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 82 Pa. Commw. 13, 18,
474 A.2d 1203, 1205-06 (1984).
241. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 16(g)(1), 96 Stat. 1102,
1117 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(g)(1) (1982)).
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tory authority and follows the correct state procedures.2 4 2 Thus, if
a PUC certified carrier or PAT (for routes located outside the incorporated area) would be denied discontinuance for intrastate service over an interstate route, such petition to abandon could be
appealed to the ICC.24 s Case law during the year following the enactment of the BRRA has indicated that, if the above referenced
criteria are met, the ICC is likely to reverse the state authority's
denial and grant the petition to abandon.2 " Again, due to the difference between the state (PUC) standard for determining if a discontinuance of service is justified and the standard applied at the
federal level (ICC), the potential for inconsistent results is a realistic concern.
III.

CONCLUSION

Of particular interest to this Comment, is the language of the
"Privatization Directive" which states that "UMTA does not consider it acceptable for localities to foreclose opportunities for private enterprise by simply pointing to local barriers to their involvement in federally assisted local transportation programs."2 4 5
This policy statement of October 1984, which articulates UMTA's
view on the importance of private sector involvement, was 'also accompanied by the warning that, if private enterprise continued to
be unfairly excluded from those programs funded by UMTA under
the UMT Act, it would be necessary to introduce additional measures to accomplish this objective. 2'" As promised, UMTA administrator Ralph Stanley announced, in a November 1985 letter to all
UMTA grantees, 247 a major new agenda to increase private-sector
participation in public transit services which will include new administrative procedures, new regulations, and a series of legislative
initiatives for consideration by the United States Congress.2 4 a In
general, the purpose of this new UMTA agenda is to give priority
consideration to applicants for grants for public transit operators
who demonstrate their commitment to competitive bidding and
242. Id. §§ 16(a), 16(e)(1)(A) & 16(g)(1), 96 Stat. 1102, 1115 & 1117 (1982) (codified at
49 U.S.C. §§ 10935(a), (e)(1)(A) & (g)(1) (1982)).
243. Id. § 16(a), 96 Stat. 1102, 1115 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10935(a) (1982)).
244. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
245. UMTA Notice of Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1984).
246. Id. at 41,310.
247. Letter from Ralph L. Stanley to UMTA Grantees (Nov. 18, 1985) (discussing additional measures to accomplish private sector participation in mass transportation
programs).
248. Privatization - UMTA Proposals, Passenger Transport No. 47, Nov. 25, 1985 at 3.
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private sector involvement.2 4 9
There are legal and regulatory problems between PUC and nonPUC certificated private carriers interested in providing public
mass transit services as agents of authorities created under the
Municipality Authorities Act or the Second Class County Port Authority Act. In addition, there are major conflicts which exist between federal legislation and the state enabling legislation. In identifying these legal and regulatory obstacles, various opinions
rendered by legal counsel for the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and several law firms have been presented. However, these are informal
opinions and do not resolve the issues.
It is important, however, that the legal problems and regulatory
conflicts identified herein be resolved since private operators may
understandably hesitate to become involved with public transit authorities until they have solid legal guidelines. Private carriers do
not want to be the "test case." In a letter to the chief counsel of
the PUC, an assistant counsel for PaDOT stated that "[t]he present situation of not having answers to these questions is hampering the expansion of transportation services . . . .We need to resolve these problems in a manner that will encourage private
operators to become involved with public transit authorities
.... ,"250 Also, in response to the PUC's modification of its evidentiary requirements for motor common carrier applications, private
carriers have commented "that they find it increasingly difficult to
exist in two very different regulatory environments-that of the
federal government and that of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. "251
An identification of the legal and regulatory obstacles which bar
opportunities for private sector involvement in the public mass
transportation system in southwestern Pennsylvania, however, is
only the first step toward achieving compliance with UMTA's
"Privatization Directive." It appears as though the key to removing legal and regulatory barriers rests with the Public Utility Commission, the official regulatory authority in Pennsylvania. Section
331 of the Public Utility Code empowers the commission to "investigate and examine the condition and management of any public
utility" and authorizes the commission to "issue a declaratory or249. Letter from Ralph L. Stanley to UMTA Grantees (Nov. 18, 1985 at 1).
250. Letter from Gareth W. Rosenau to Charles F. Hoffman, Chief Counsel, Pa. PUC
(Oct. 29, 1982 at 2) (discussing private operator contracts/loss of PUC rights).
251. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. No. 51, Dec. 18, 1982 at 4283.
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der to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."25' 2 Legislative reform, however, may be necessary to remove those impediments directly pertaining to the Municipality Authorities Act,
since there is no internal mechanism within that Act for such
changes. Finally, the Second Class County Port Authority Act appears to be flexible enough to accommodate private enterprise participation. Unfortunately, one major barrier to Port Authority
Transit's efforts to involve private carriers in public transportation
programs relates to the labor protection requirements of section
13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act. However, UMTA, as
part of its legislative initiative package to the United States Congress plans to propose a repeal of the section 13(c) labor protection
provision as a means to increase private sector involvement.
John R. Hanlon

252.

Public Utility Code, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 331(a) and (f) (Purdon 1978).

